HUNTERS BECOMING PREY: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

The concept of using an unmanned aerial vehicle for military purposes dates back to the 1840s. Even if we set aside the primitive versions involving balloons, UAVs have a history stretching back to the 1910s. The first modern example, the British Queen Bee target aircraft, which is considered the first of its kind, made its maiden flight in 1935. Subsequent developments have enabled UAVs to offer superior capabilities to military forces.

According to data from the Centre for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, while only 60 countries had military UAVs in their inventories in 2010, this number had increased to 95 countries by 2019. Furthermore, although open source data shows that 21,000 military UAVs serve various states, this number is estimated to be over 30,000.

Global expectations indicate that the military UAV market will continue to expand. According to Teal Group’s forecast, from 2020 to 2029, the global annual value of military unmanned aerial vehicle production is expected to rise from $5.6 billion to $14 billion, with a total value over the decade reaching $95.5 billion.

Turkey’s UAV Journey

Although not yet part of the inventory, Turkey’s first domestic UAV, UAV-X1, saw the production of two prototypes by TAI in 1992. Following the UAV-X1 project, many projects from different institutions received support. Turkey has progressed from joint production concepts to fully domestic manufacturing, from projects gaining R&D experience to UAVs entering the inventory, and from UAVs meeting training needs to those used in operations.

In line with the sector’s development, TAI, the developer of Turkey’s first domestic UAV, delivered the ANKA-I UAV, which enables aerial signal intelligence collection, to the relevant security units in 2018, in collaboration with ASELSAN.

According to data from the Centre for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, by 2019, 63 of the 95 countries with military UAVs in their inventories had UAVs that were mostly or entirely imported, 20 had a mix of both produced and imported UAVs, and 12 had inventories consisting primarily of domestically produced UAVs.

Turkey, which has recently strived to integrate domestically developed UAVs into its inventory, is now a country capable of meeting not only its own UAV and SİHA needs but also those of friendly nations.

The effectiveness of Turkish SİHAs (armed UAVs) has caught the attention of various international officials. For example, British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace highlighted that Turkish UAVs had effectively targeted and destroyed multiple command and control points and two transport aircraft at the Cufra Airfield controlled by the “Libyan National Army” led by the coup leader Hafter. He clearly stated that the effective use of UAVs in Libya and Syria was “game-changing.”

One source of this success is BAYKAR Defence’s tactical UAV system, developed for Turkey in the early 2010s. During this period, Turkey faced delays and technical deficiencies with the Herons it had agreed to purchase for $180 million, which hampered their effective use.

Supporting military strategic technologies, maintaining R&D discipline despite urgent needs, and adopting new technologies by military units are fundamental conditions for the success of the defense and aerospace sector. However, as seen in the UAV experience, even when these requirements are met, access to strategic technology can be delayed for various reasons. The success of Turkish SİHAs demonstrates the significance of such delays.

Turkish SİHAs in Karabakh

The success of Turkish SİHAs in Syria and Libya led to them being perceived as a “threat” with an uncertain depth by Armenia at the beginning of the Second Karabakh War. Neither Armenia nor other countries initially understood the potential impact of UAVs. During the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan effectively used UAVs, possibly with “advisory support” from Turkey, demonstrating that the nature of battlefields had fundamentally changed.

Armenia’s UAV capabilities were quite limited. Although specific information is not available, experts believe that Armenia had local UAVs such as Baze, Krunk 25-1, and Krunk 25-2, and the Russian Ptero-5E. However, these small UAVs with intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance features could not be compared with Bayraktar TB2 SİHAs.

Turkish F-16s acted as a deterrent alongside Azerbaijan. Armenia, on the other hand, was unable to use the Su-30 fighter jets purchased from Russia without missiles against Azerbaijan, as later admitted by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

Pashinyan also admitted that the “Repellent” electronic warfare system purchased from Russia in 2017 for $42 million failed to protect the “airspace” as intended. The failure of electronic warfare systems played a crucial role in the success of UAVs and SİHAs during the war.

Old Soviet systems like 2K11 Krug, 9K33 Osa, 2K12 Kub, and 9K35 Strela-10, which were significant parts of Armenia’s air defense, could detect small aircraft but could not stop Turkish SİHAs. The S-300 missile systems, considered a key element in border protection before the war, had sensors designed for detecting, identifying, and tracking moving targets. However, these sensors overlooked small and slow UAVs.

UAVs that were not stopped by air defense systems contributed to the downfall of these very systems. Specifically, Azerbaijan destroyed 7 S-300 air defense systems belonging to Armenia and rendered 1 S-300 radar and 2 S-300 detection stations unusable.

Despite early evaluations in 2018 suggesting that the Pantsir S1 air defense system could not detect low-speed and small-sized targets, Russia tried to maintain the reputation of this crucial system for arms exports.

Reports in 2018 suggested that various systems, including Heron (Israel), RQ-21A Blackjack (USA), and a Turkish UAV, were destroyed by Pantsir systems in Syria. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that S-400 and Pantsir air defense systems, supported by fighter jets, guaranteed Russia’s air superiority in Syria.

An article in Russia Beyond in January 2018 mentioned that out of 13 UAVs attacking the Khmeimim Air Base in Syria, 3 were shot down by the Pantsir S1 system. The article suggested that it was hard to imagine what this system could do to UAVs, given its ability to easily destroy a fighter jet.

According to NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) assessments of Turkey’s Idlib operation, Pantsir S1 systems were serious threats to UAVs and needed to be struck immediately. However, JAPCC noted that the “Pantsir S-1’s active system could not detect small, smart munitions fired from the Bayraktar TB2 SİHA due to intense electronic warfare measures, despite being within radar range.”

Publicly available images and assessments indicate that Turkish UAVs successfully destroyed Pantsir S1 air defense systems in various regions. During the Second Karabakh War, Pantsir S1 systems were also destroyed by SİHAs under Azerbaijani control. Thus, even though Pantsir S1 systems were effective against certain targets, they were rendered ineffective by relatively low-cost UAVs. In summary, hunters have become prey.

According to Russia Beyond, Pantsir S1 systems, which have a firing rate of 5,000 rounds per minute, require barrel changes every 8,000 shots. Therefore, the addition of this system to the inventory involves various costs.

Turkish SİHAs have reportedly destroyed dozens of air defense systems and components in Syria, Libya, and Karabakh. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated that Turkish SİHAs had destroyed Armenian munitions worth over $1 billion during the Second Karabakh War. The total value of weapons destroyed and captured by Armenia during the 44-day war is estimated to be $4.8 billion.

By minimizing risks to valuable human resources and protecting ground troops from air attacks and potential ground-based military strikes, effective cost operations rendered enemy forces partially “incapable” of combat.

The repeated success of UAVs and SİHAs in destroying various air defense systems has led to questioning the effectiveness of air defense systems against modern threats. The fact that air defense systems, valued at millions of dollars and developed over a long period, are rendered ineffective by low-cost, expendable systems highlights the importance of this scrutiny.

The long-predicted impact of unmanned systems on military paradigms on land, sea, and air has been demonstrated in the Second Karabakh War, which can be considered the first clear example of the anticipated paradigm shift. In this regard, it is also historically significant from a military perspective.

The Second Karabakh War, likely to be assessed in literature as a case of disruption to conventional military systems and operational concepts, holds particular moral significance for the Azerbaijani Turks and the Turkish World.

The Nagorno-Karabakh region, where Azerbaijani Turks were subjected to various atrocities, forced to flee their homes, and had 20% of their territory under Armenian occupation, was one of the deepest wounds in the heart of the Turkish World for years. The unlawful occupation was halted in the Second Karabakh War that began on September 27, 2020.

With the game-changing power of advanced technologies, including Turkish SİHAs, Azerbaijan reclaimed its lands after nearly 30 years. Armenia, despite spending millions of dollars, remained out of the game with its ineffective military equipment and systems.

Azerbaijan hoisted its flag over Karabakh… Yesterday’s cruel hunters have become prey today, and Karabakh, the land of the Turks, is now free…